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 Professor Dr. Rolf H. Weber und Romana Weber, Zürich 
 
International ordre public for terrorism-related Internet content?∗ 
 
 Existing measures are not sufficient to satisfactorily combat the dissemination of illegal 
con-tent on the internet. Therefore, the existing international Conventions on terrorism 
need to be concretized and measures to have to be found to effectively implement and 
enforce them. The fact that terrorism merits to be prohibited is commonly acknowl-
edged and constitutes part of international ordre public. Terrorist acts violate human 
rights, in particular the right to life as one of the most fundamental human rights. If 
the security interests outweigh the individual’s rights to freedom of speech or open 
communication in particular case, the illegal information has to be removed from the 
internet. However, not only repressive, but also preventive actions need to be taken. 
Preventive efforts can consist in the introduction of technological barriers, the threat 
for Internet providers of being held liable or the threat for nation states of being sanc-
tioned for not complying with their obligations. 
S. 52 - HFR 4/2009 S. 1 - 
1 I. Introduction  
The global nature of the Internet and the ease of access make it a premium medium 
for the dissemination of information. The various information channels allow the distri-
bution of legal, but also of illegal contents. This problem is aggravated by the fact that 
activities can be carried out in the online world by an unprecedented speed and degree 
of anonymity. Dissemination proceeds cheaply and effortlessly without a high risk of 
prosecution due to the chaotic structure of the Internet and due to the fact that “tra-
ces” of cybercommunications can be easily hidden. Furthermore, Western democratic 
states have up to now been strongly resisting to national control measures because of 
the high value given to the freedom of speech1.  
2 Through the Internet, the public can be very easily reached directly. The Internet of-
fers the possibility to broadcast illegal content worldwide, uncensored and unfiltered. 
Chat rooms, websites and bulletin boards are largely uncontrolled, only few filters have 
been established2.  
3 With regard to terrorism, it is particularly data mining, planning and coordination, in-
structions and online manuals, terrorist propaganda and threats, recruitment, training 
and mobilization as well as fundraising and financing that takes place on the Internet. 
Furthermore, the Internet also serves as platform for attacking other terrorists3. Such 
                                                   
∗ Der Aufsatz wurde im Rahmen des 7. Beitragswettbewerbes "Recht in Zeiten des Terrors" angefertigt. Rolf 
H. Weber is chair professor for Private, Business and European Law, Director at the Center for Information 
and Communication Law at the University of Zurich Faculty of Law and Attorney-at-Law in Zurich. Romana 
Weber, lic. iur., is research assistant at the University of Zurich Faculty of Law and a Ph.D. student. The au-
thors would like to thank Prof. Christine Kaufmann, University of Zurich, for her valuable comments and in-
puts. 
1 GABRIEL WEIMANN, Online Terrorism – Modern Terrorists and the Internet, in: GLAAB (ed.), Medien und Ter-
rorismus – Auf den Spuren einer symbiotischen Beziehung, Berlin 2007, 51-58, at 51-52; STEPHAN ALEXANDER 
WEICHERT, Die Propaganda der Tat – Zur Kommunikationsstrategie des modernen Aufmerksamkeitsterroris-
mus, in: GLAAB (ed.), Medien und Terrorismus – Auf den Spuren einer symbiotischen Beziehung, Berlin 
2007, 83-98, at 94-95; ROLF H. WEBER, Regulatory Models for the Online World, Zurich 2002, at 190. 
2 WEIMANN (fn. 1), at 54. 
3 For further explanations on the uses of the Internet by terrorists see GABRIEL WEIMANN, Terror on the Inter-
net, Washington 2006, at 111-145; STEPHEN M. FURNELL/MATT J. WARREN, Computer Hacking and Cyber Ter-
 
HFR 4/2009 Rolf H. Weber/Romana Weber International ordre public 
 
Aufsatz 
 
 
HUMBOLDT FORUM RECHT – www.humboldt-forum-recht.de 
 
kind of information can be considered illegal, as it supports the undertaking of terrorist 
actions, which violate human rights, in particular the right to life and health4. For in-
formation to be considered illegal having the consequence that a prohibition of dis-
semination would prevail the right to freedom of speech and open communication5, an 
actual or potential threat for the society must be established. While the presentation of 
terrorist views, propaganda or fundraising and financing do not constitute an immedi-
ate danger to human life or health, they contribute significantly to the execution of ter-
rorist attacks. This indirect threat is sufficient to shed light on the issue of a balancing 
of interests. 
S. 53 - HFR 4/2009 S. 2 - 
4 The dissemination of illegal content is prohibited by most national criminal laws, irre-
spective of the carrier of the information. However, bearing in mind the global dimen-
sion of the Internet, individual states do not have sufficient power and resources to ef-
fectively tackle the problem of the dissemination of illegal terrorist information. Inter-
national co-operation mechanisms should improve the fight against terrorism; other 
means are the development of new forms of self-regulation, the public-private “co-
regulation”, as well as national instruments for removing and blocking illegal content. If 
mechanisms for international co-operation are established, states can operate across 
borders, thereby benefiting from experiences of other states in their own implementa-
tion and enforcement of rules6. 
5 II. Content-related regulation 
1. Problem of common understanding 
While current international harmonization mainly attempts to protect fundamental 
rights, achieving agreements on the limits of these rights has proved to be much more 
difficult. Establishing a common understanding of illegal content in the Internet is chal-
lenging as different standards are applied by various users and legislators. Political, 
historical, religious and social considerations lead to different understandings. Further-
more, reality shows that the persons concerned often react differently depending upon 
their view of the situation. Not everybody finds the same degree of information offend-
ing, or shows the same sensitivity in respect of civility and cultural integrity. Neverthe-
less, in some critical areas the development of a common understanding can be ob-
served disregarding any political maneuvers; some basic issues of civility are not really 
in dispute. Accordingly, at the Stockholm gathering in 2000, where 700 delegates from 
46 countries participated, European leaders such as Germany’s former Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder and Switzerland’s former Federal Councillor Ruth Dreifuss warned 
that the Internet should not become a cross-border vector for racist theories fomenting 
hate and discrimination7. 
6 Up to now, an international consensus exists only to a limited extent on issues such as 
racism, obscenity, discrimination or hate8. However, a positive tendency towards a 
change of this practice can be observed concerning terrorism which eventually may 
lead to an agreement within the international community stating that the restriction of 
                                                   
rorism: The Real Threats in the New Millenium?, Computers and Security, Vol. 18, 1999, 28-34, at 29; FRED 
COHEN, Terrorism and Cyberspace, Network Security, Vol. 5, 2002, 17-19, at 18-19. 
4 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Cyberterrorism – The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, Strasbourg 2007, at 
33-38. 
5 Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
6 The need to counter the terrorist use of the Internet was also articulated by the Council of Europe, COUNCIL 
OF EUROPE, Internet – A Critical Resource for All, Document presented by the Secretary General of the Coun-
cil of Europe to the Internet Governance Forum, Hyderabad, India, 3-6 December 2008, at 13; HELEN KEL-
LER, Expertenpanel: Freiheit durch Sicherheit ohne Freiheit – Die Problematik der Terrorismusbekämpfung, 
in: KIRCHSCHLÄGER ET AL. (eds), Menschenrechte und Terrorismus, 1. Internationales Menschenrechtsforum 
Luzern (IHRF), Bern 2004, 145-147, at 145. 
7 WEBER (fn. 1), at 190. 
8 United Nations World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination and Xenophobia in late 2001; WEBER 
(fn. 1), at 190-191 and 194-195. 
HFR 4/2009 Rolf H. Weber/Romana Weber International ordre public 
 
Aufsatz 
 
 
HUMBOLDT FORUM RECHT – www.humboldt-forum-recht.de 
 
freedom of speech (amongst other human rights) is justified in order to take action 
against the dissemination of terrorist information on the Internet. 
S. 54 - HFR 4/2009 S. 3 - 
7 So far, no universally accepted definition of the term “terrorism” is available. In this 
contribution, terrorism will refer to movements pursuing political, religious or ideologi-
cal goals. Accordingly, these movements have a public character. Furthermore, terror-
ist actions use the exercise or threat of violence against humans or propriety to 
achieve their goals; their aim is to succeed in their protest by intimidation or exercise 
of pressure on other individuals9. 
8 During the last few years, a broad consensus has emerged that terrorist actions are 
illegal. In case of terrorist attacks, various human rights are violated and innocent 
people hurt. Furthermore, if terrorists act internationally, they intrude into the territory 
of sovereign states. The respective acts cannot be justified, which makes them illegal 
considering their consequences. The fight against terrorism also serves the protection 
of securing peace by a legally established co-operation of states10. 
9 Furthermore, a common understanding has evolved that terrorism must be fought. 
This acknowledgement asks for repressive as well as preventive measures. On the one 
hand, the dissemination of new terrorist information on the Internet needs to be pre-
vented; mechanisms have to be put in place which control the relevant information 
made available online and which have the power to prohibit certain information from 
being made accessible to all users. On the other hand, illegal terrorist material already 
available in the Internet has to be discovered and removed. Considering the enormous 
amount of information available on the Internet, such a task is challenging, in particu-
lar because illegal information is often hidden. However, with the help of all users of 
the Internet, the goal of removing illegal terrorist content can be realized to a far ex-
tent. 
10 In general, efforts to establish principles of a common understanding are worth sup-
porting since restraints on commonly unwanted issues could also help to achieve politi-
cal appeasement11. 
11 2. Rulemaking approaches 
Tackling the problem of dissemination of illegal terrorist content on the Internet re-
quires specific regulations based on research related to technical blocking and control 
mechanisms on the Internet. These regulations must take into consideration the con-
sequences of such measures for human rights, in particular freedom of speech. 
S. 55 - HFR 4/2009 S. 4 - 
12 2.1 Government regulation 
Traditional government regulation is usually the first reaction to an undesired social 
development; this approach has also been chosen as regards illegal content on the 
Internet. Most countries have either passed special laws protecting citizens or certain 
parts of the population, for example minors, against different forms of undesirable con-
tent, or have at least amended existing laws. However, from a legal and practical per-
spective, success has been rather limited. Discrepancies between fundamental rights 
                                                   
9 For an approach of a definition of terrorism see ROLF H. WEBER/ROLAND UNTERNÄHRER, Wirtschaftsterrorismus 
im Internet, in: ACKERMANN/DONATSCH/REHBERG (eds), Wirtschaft und Strafrecht, Zurich 2001, 365-380, at 
366-368; WEIMANN (fn. 1), at 21-22; PETER J. VAN KRIEKEN, Terrorism and the International Legal Order, The 
Hague 2002, at 13-20; JEAN-CHRISTOPHE MARTIN, Les Règles Internationales Relatives à la Lutte Contre le 
Terrorisme, Bruxelles 2006, at 35-69; ANTONIO CASSESE, International Criminal Law, 2nd edition Oxford 
2008, at 166-169. 
10 HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE, Das Völkerrecht wird unterschätzt, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, Vol. 
3/2004, 38-60, at 43; CASSESE (fn. 9), at 163-165. 
11 WEBER (fn. 1), at 190-191. 
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and desired restrictions on free speech become even more cumbersome if the terms 
used in the respective legal provisions are vague and difficult to define satisfactorily12. 
13 The major disadvantage of traditional government regulation consists in its restricted 
territorial applicability. National cyber-policies have only a limited impact since they do 
not lead to a global approach. Because an international agreement does not exist re-
garding reasonable content regulation on the Internet, a geographically limited ap-
proach fails to have a widespread effect13. Even if adequate regulation of illegal Inter-
net content does exist, enforcement of the respective norms can be hampered with dif-
ficulties, in particular in countries with weak judicial systems.  
14 Furthermore, balancing different interests or applying the „proportionality test“ only 
lead to very vague determination of doubtful activities and consequently remain open 
to different understandings under varying social and cultural circumstances which 
makes a uniform application of regulations concerning illegal content unlikely, even if 
an international consensus can be assumed to exist concerning terrorist information14. 
This fact causes different interpretations of various countries concerning the prohibition 
of illegal terrorist content on the Internet, preventing a general fight against the dis-
semination of particular information. 
15 2.2 International agreements 
International agreements establish a common understanding of the member states re-
garding a specific topic. International regulation is more adapted to the global nature 
of the Internet than domestic regulation as it is not territorially bound. Furthermore, it 
defines the elements of an offence in a way obliging the international community, 
whereas state regulations often vary from one another in specific definitions15.  
S. 56 - HFR 4/2009 S. 5 - 
16 However, the preparation and incorporation of international agreements usually takes 
several years. Because the problem of terrorism flourishes by using the Internet as a 
platform, though, cross-border rules need to be established as promptly as possible. 
Generally looking, the international community has issued various calls in different le-
gal formats for the suppression of terrorism16. Nevertheless, they are all based upon 
the idea of criminal law having a preventive character on the individuals to commit a 
                                                   
12 WEBER (fn. 1), at 191; for examples of national legislation see also HELEN KELLER, Nach dem 11. September 
2001 – Terrorismusbekämpfung als Herausforderung des Rechtsstaates, in: KAPPEL/TOBLER/WALDMANN (eds), 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, Freiburg i. Br. 2005, 255-280, at 256-270. 
13 WEBER (fn. 1), at 193. 
14 WEBER (fn. 1), at 193; KLAUS W. GREWLICH, Governance in “Cyberspace”, The Hague/London/Boston 1999, 
at 286-288. 
15 GREWLICH (fn. 14), at 291. 
16 UN Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, in-
cluding diplomatic agents (with resolution 3166 [XXVIII] of the General Assembly of the United Nations) of 
14 December 1973, UN Convention against the taking of hostages of 17 December 1979, UN Convention for 
the suppression of terrorist bombs of 15 December 1997, UN Convention for the suppression of the financ-
ing of terrorism of 9 December 1999, UN Convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism of 14 
September 2005, UN Convention on offences and certain other acts committed on board aircraft of 14 Sep-
tember 1963, UN Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft of 16 December 1970, UN 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (with Final Act of the In-
ternational Conference on Air Law held under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization at 
Montreal in September 1971) of 23 September 1971, UN Convention on the physical protection of nuclear 
material of 26 October 1979, Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving in-
ternational civil aviation of 24 February 1988, UN Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against 
the safety of maritime navigation of 10 March 1988, Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against 
the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf of 10 March 1988, UN Convention on the Mark-
ing of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection of 1 March 1991, General Assembly Resolutions 49/60 
of 9 December 1994 51/210 of 16 January 1997 concerning measures to eliminate international terrorism, 
Security Council Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999, Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 
2001, Security Council Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004; many agreements have also been concluded at a 
regional level, for a list of relevant Conventions see VAN KRIEKEN (fn. 9), at 20-22. Furthermore, the United 
Nations General Assembly appointed an Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate a comprehensive Convention on in-
ternational terrorism. 
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particular crime and serving the purpose of ensuring that delinquents can be prose-
cuted. International agreements follow the same reasoning; they define the elements 
of criminal acts and oblige state members to punish offenders adequately or to extra-
dite them17. While these agreements acknowledge that international co-operation is 
necessary to address terrorism, they do not provide for specific recommendations con-
cerning this co-operation. Furthermore, the subject of these agreements is to fight ter-
rorist acts in general; they do not provide for specific co-operation recommendations, 
nor do they contain references to the dissemination of terrorist content in particular.  
17 In a new Convention, the subject of dissemination of terrorist content on the Internet 
would have to be addressed explicitly. A respective agreement would simplify the pro-
cess of eliminating terrorist information from the Internet and prevent new illegal ter-
rorist content from being uploaded online. In substance, such an international consen-
sus would need to include a definition on what constitutes illegal content in general in 
order to justify measures eliminating such content as well as to serve as basis for the 
establishment of liability or sanctions. Furthermore, rules for establishing liability of 
Internet providers should also be harmonized in order to confront provider neglecting 
their obligations with sanctions supported by a large majority of states. Moreover, spe-
cific rules about the co-operation of states have to be included in international agree-
ments. Co-operation entails the exchange of information18, assistance in technical and 
administrative matters as well as joint movements to avoid appearance of illegal con-
tent in the Internet. The principles relating to international co-operation included in the 
Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe19 could be introduced into such a 
new Convention. Means of communication have to be established which are secure in 
transporting this information to other countries. The Internet is a particularly suitable 
framework for international co-operation as it is accessible from everywhere, enabling 
governments to examine specific websites and exchange thoughts as well as be active 
in eliminating illegal content at the same time. Nevertheless, from a realistic point of 
view, it seems rather unlikely that such a new Convention will be agreed upon by most 
states in the near future; therefore, other legal means need to be considered. 
S. 57 - HFR 4/2009 S. 6 - 
18 2.3 Self-regulation 
Several self-regulatory mechanisms at different levels exist which can be used to over-
come the deficiencies of other regulatory approaches. A reason for turning to self-
regulation is that state regulations are often not flexible enough to adapt legislation to 
the fast-changing needs of the Internet community and the applicability of state laws is 
limited to their own territory20.  
19 Most self-regulatory mechanisms fall under the notion of “soft law”. According to the 
traditional conception21, soft law is not enforceable or creating liability for the violator, 
because soft law is not formally binding. Soft law is often used as a catchphrase for 
particular forms of social rules close to public international law. Although soft law is not 
legally binding, it nevertheless has a certain legal significance22. For example, the pos-
sibility exists that through the existence of soft law, the creation of according custom-
ary law and the codification thereof is prepared and encouraged23. Furthermore, courts 
can use soft law in the interpretation of formal legal sources24. 
                                                   
17 HEINTZE (fn. 10), at 44. 
18 See also MARTIN (fn. 9), at 362-375. 
19 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, done at Budapest on 23 November 2001. 
20 WEBER (fn. 1), at 195-196. 
21 KNUT IPSEN, Völkerrecht, 5th edition Munich 2004, at § 19 N 20. 
22 DANIEL THÜRER, Völkerrecht, 3rd edition Zurich 2007, at 124-125. 
23 IPSEN (fn. 21), at § 19 N 21. 
24 MARKUS KRAJEWSKI, Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht, Heidelberg 2006, at N 90. 
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20 Self-regulation25 can be introduced through the issuance and private enactment of 
codes of conduct. The respective codes are established by parties active in a specific 
field and interested in achieving a particular goal, most often international organizati-
ons or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They could incorporate guidelines on 
Internet content and protection measures against illegal content. Bodies responsible for 
the introduction of according codes, as well as for their implementation and enforce-
ment, should be appointed. Furthermore, if these self-regulatory bodies hear from the 
occurrence of illegal content on the Internet, they should immediately take steps to 
remove the respective information. As cyberspace is a highly technical environment, 
bodies responsible for effective enforcement of codes of conduct need to have extensi-
ve knowledge about technical possibilities to avoid the dissemination of illegal content. 
Therefore, NGOs active in the field of Internet functioning would be appropriate for the 
task. The state legislator could encourage and support the implementation of a code of 
conduct by granting it legal recognition or by pursuing a concept of “regulated self-
regulation” or “co-regulation”26. 
S. 58 - HFR 4/2009 S. 7 - 
21 Another approach consists in the introduction of self-classification and filter systems. 
Such technological mechanisms allow the users to apply appropriate selection criteria 
according to their own judgment27. However, terrorist information is illegal in general. 
Therefore, the user should not even be able to make that choice at all; the dissemina-
tion of the respective content has to be prevented in general, without differing accord-
ing to various groups of users.  
22 The implementation of Internet hotlines is a further possible method of self-regulation. 
Such mechanisms provide users with the opportunity to identify illegal or undesired 
Internet content by entering details about the location of a site into a form on a web 
page. The receiver of the message does not just act as a mailbox, but also as an iden-
tifier of problematic content. Moreover, the hotlines (1) forward the complaint to the 
respective authorities, (2) process the identification of the source of the content by 
evaluating the criticized content as legal or illegal (evaluation function), and (3) make 
the decision to inform other hotlines and/or service providers. Since hotlines can co-
operate internationally more easily and effectively than state enforcement authorities, 
and since they offer users reliable and immediately responsive points of content, col-
laboration among hotlines is vital28.  
23 The problem of code-based regulation is that it leaves the control of access to what-
ever information to private persons, not a democratically legitimate government. How-
ever, the balancing of security interests against human rights should not be left to pri-
vate institutions29. As the regulation thereof can interfere with government policies and 
consequently involve public interests, it should be the government itself or a suprana-
                                                   
25 The general advantages of self-regulation include efficiency, increased flexibility, better incentives for 
compliance, and reduced costs. The acceleration of technological and social developments may also point to 
an approach which uses soft-law instruments, voluntary agreements, and co-operative self-regulation (for 
further details see WEBER [fn. 1], at 83-84 and 198). 
26 WEBER (fn. 1), at 196. 
27 WEBER (fn. 1), at 196-197; JACK M. BALKIN/BETH SIMONE NOVECK/KERMIT ROOSEVELT, Filtern von Internet-
Inhalten, Ein Best-Practices-Model, in: WALTERMANN/MACHILL (eds), Verantwortung im Internet – Selbstregul-
ierung und Jugendschutz, Gütersloh 2000, 211-284, at 212-221; STUART BIEGEL, Beyond Our Control?, Con-
fronting the Limits of Our Legal System in the Age of Cyberspace, Cambridge Massachusetts 2001, at 200-
201; HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Developments in the Law – The Law of Cyberspace, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 
112, 1999, 1574-1704, at 1597-1603. 
28 WEBER (fn. 1), at 197-198; HERBERT BURKERT, Hotlines, in: WALTERMANN/MACHILL (eds), Verantwortung im 
Internet – Selbstregulierung und Jugendschutz, Gütersloh 2000, 285-344; see also 
<http://www.fsm.de/de/Beschwerdestelle>; as an example for an early hotline see the Dutch Meldpunt, 
<http://www.meldpunt-kinderporno.nl/en/>. 
29 LAWRENCE LESSIG, The Future of Ideas, New York 2001, at 17-99. 
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tional body that decides which contents are illegal30. 
24 The effectiveness of self-regulatory mechanisms varies considerably according to the 
existence of domestic organizational structures capable of implementing self-regulatory 
schemes31. Criticism of self-regulation generally focuses on the private regulator’s lack 
of democratic legitimacy, a subversion of regulatory goals to business goals, and the 
inadequacy of enforcement measures in self-regulatory regimes. At the moment, there 
is not much experience to draw on with regard to self-regulatory measures for Internet 
content control. However, experiences with self-regulation in the traditional field of 
media control (printing and electronic media) are in many cases good, even though not 
always unproblematic. Still, it should not be overseen that traditional media and the 
Internet are used differently and therefore require different rules32. 
S. 59 - HFR 4/2009 S. 8 - 
25 Existing self-regulatory mechanisms applicable in respect of Internet content could be 
improved under various approaches. First and foremost, the acceptability of soft-law 
measures might increase if the technical environment was standardized and harmo-
nized. Filtering and self-rating software should be easily accessible and applicable 
without requiring the user to be a technological expert. Market participants and/or their 
industry organizations are in a position to fulfill this requirement if they are prepared to 
give up the notion of single approaches33. 
26 A solution to the enforcement problem of self-regulatory codes of conduct does not ex-
ist. However, if the state legislator takes steps to improve self-regulation, the standing 
of such rules will improve, as the willingness of market participants to observe the ru-
les does not necessarily need to be based on strict legal provisions34. Furthermore, in-
formation about according codes of conduct also needs to be disseminated at an inter-
national level. International organizations or NGOs with a broad access to the public 
are best equipped for this task. The involvement of the public is indispensable in order 
to achieve the elimination of illegal content on the Internet. Tips from citizens who ha-
ve, by chance or on purpose, encountered illegal information are indispensable as pro-
fessionals will not be able to eliminate all illegal information by themselves, the struc-
ture of the Internet is too complex and too much information is available online to have 
an oversight. However, this presupposes that the public is aware of the problem of ille-
gal content on the Internet and of the institutions to which they should turn in case 
they discover according material.  
S. 60 - HFR 4/2009 S. 9 - 
27 3. Evaluation 
The existing rulemaking approaches are not sufficient to ensure that terrorist informa-
tion is not disseminated on the Internet. Further mechanisms need to be introduced in 
order to increase the protection of individuals from terrorist attacks, which are often 
prepared online.  
28 Improvements have to be made in the sharing of information as well as in the alloca-
tion of tasks related to the control of the global cyberspace. Regulation of international 
co-operation needs to include the obligation of states to adapt their domestic legisla-
tion to the respective international standards and provisions concerning the establish-
ment and maintenance of channels of communication between different states’ compe-
tent agencies and services to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information. 
                                                   
30 WEBER (fn. 1), at 202-203; LAWRENCE LESSIG, Tyranny in the Infrastructure: The CDA Was Bad – But PICS 
May Be Worse, Wired Magazine, July 1997. 
31 GREWLICH (fn. 14), at 269. 
32 WEBER (fn. 1), at 199-201; ANGELA CAMPBELL, Self-Regulation and the Media, Federal Communications Law 
Journal, Vol. 51, 1999, 711-772, at 768-772. 
33 WEBER (fn. 1), at 118-124 and 201, with further references. 
34 WEBER (fn. 1), at 202. 
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Spontaneous information should also be encouraged in case of unexpected events35.  
29 New, globally applicable, rules for national substantive law and national procedural law, 
regulations concerning international co-operation, as well as rules establishing public-
private partnerships would increase international involvement in the fight against ter-
rorism36. A need for action to deal with the dissemination of illegal content in the 
Internet exists in all four areas: (1) Rules on illegal Internet content as well as respon-
sibility of Internet providers need to be harmonized in substantive criminal law; (2) 
sanctions, the admittance of evidence and data privacy should be harmonized in pro-
cedural law; (3) the necessity of administrative and judicial assistance requires mecha-
nisms for international co-operation; and (4) public-private partnerships involve all in-
terested parties in the fight against terrorism, including individuals, which leads to 
manifold inputs and a broader acceptance of taken deci61ons. 
30 The regulations to be created would have to be sufficiently precise in order to ensure 
their uniform application by members. Only if states interpret their obligations in the 
same way, their joint efforts to eliminate the dissemination of illegal information will be 
successful. Furthermore, precision in the definitions is also necessary to ensure an 
adequate balancing of measures for the elimination of illegal content against the 
restrictions on individual freedoms. However, a common understanding of most states 
to establish a respective Convention is unlikely to be achieved soon. Therefore, the 
question is whether existing mechanisms in international law can be applied and/or 
further developed in order to prevent illegal terrorism-related information from being 
made available online. 
S. 61 - HFR 4/2009 S. 10 - 
31 III. Application of international ordre public? 
With terrorism being a major threat to international peace and security37, fighting ter-
rorism may be linked to the concept of ordre public. 
32 1. Ordre public in international law 
1.1 Ordre public in general 
Ordre public represents the fundamental elements underlying and unifying every legal 
system. It represents a social interest of the entire society and is derived from the cul-
tural and moral foundation of a society. The basis of every society can be found in its 
ordre public; when individuals had no other choice than to unify in order to originate 
new forces, their “contrat social”, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau38 described the joining 
together, included the fundamental values that the ordre public represents. 
33 Ordre public has a normative character on its own by representing a common under-
standing39. It is subject of possible changes and has to be adapted or modified accord-
ing to current views and changing conditions40. 
34 Most commonly, the concept of ordre public is used by countries in national and private 
international law; even in these situations, reference to public international law is 
                                                   
35 For the need of further co-operation see van KRIEKEN (fn. 9), at 7. 
36 See above II. 2.2; COUNCIL OF EUROPE (fn. 4), at 96-97; ULRICH SIEBER, Staatliche Regulierung, Strafverfol-
gung und Selbstregulierung: Für ein neues Bündnis zur Bekämpfung rechtswidriger Inhalte im Internet, in: 
WALTERMANN/MACHILL (eds), Verantwortung im Internet – Selbstregulierung und Jugendschutz, Gütersloh 
2000, 345-432, at 395-399. 
37 Security Council Resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001. 
38 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract and Discourses by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, translated with an 
Introduction by G. D. H. Cole, London/Toronto 1923, Livre I, Chapitre VI, para. 2, available at 
<http//oll.libertyfund.org/ title/638>; for a philosophic approach to the governing of the Internet see also 
ROLF H. WEBER/ROMANA WEBER, Social Contract for the Internet Community?, forthcoming. 
39 WERNER LEVI, The International Ordre Public, Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et po-
litiques, Vol. 72, 1994, 55-77, at 57-59. 
40 LEVI (fn. 39), at 77. 
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made. The international ordre public referred to in the given context must be distingu-
ished from the ordre public of the private international law system and national ordres 
publics41. The existence of an ordre public in public international law was contested for 
many years; however, it is now accepted as part of an evolving international constitu-
tional law42. In the framework of international public law, ordre public is the expression 
of fundamental values of the international community. Norms of the ordre public touch 
the interests of all states to a special degree43. 
S. 62 - HFR 4/2009 S. 11 - 
35 1.2 Delimitation of ordre public to other categories of norms in public interna-
tional law 
Ordre public is not the same as ius cogens. While ordre public has a broad field of ap-
plication covering the entire legal order, including and in particular spiritual and social 
goals, only the most fundamental human rights are considered to be ius cogens. For 
the same reasons, ius cogens is distinct to a general common understanding; while ius 
cogens is always also a common understanding, not all issues based on a common un-
derstanding represent ius cogens norms, but only the most fundamental ones.  
36 Ius cogens is binding; deviations are not admissible. This fact, however, does not sug-
gest that other standards included in the ordre public are not binding. The most basic 
human rights represent norms with erga omnes effect. This effect implies that all 
states have a legal interest in the protection of the underlying rights because of their 
fundamental value44. Adherence to norms with erga omnes effect is owed to the whole 
international community. The category of norms with erga omnes effect addresses the 
question of towards whom states are obliged to adhere to the respective norms.  
37 The logic of the fact that a nation state is bound by an erga omnes obligation towards 
the international community leads to the conclusion that all states can take reprisals 
against other states violating a norm with erga omnes effect45. The difference of these 
norms to ius cogens is that deviations are permissible under specific circumstances46.  
38 Another distinction between ius cogens and ordre public can be seen in the rank of ius 
cogens and the intensity of the obligation of the respective human rights connected 
thereto. Deviations form ius cogens on a contractual basis are not permissible; ius co-
gens has an increased strength of validity47.  
39 1.3 Effects of ordre public 
Ordre public is a particularly useful concept in the field of international law, since legis-
lation is often unable in creating laws to keep pace with the rapid growth of emerging 
interests. Neither national legislation nor a multilateral treaty nor customary law are 
suitable to provide for regulation within a short span of time. Therefore, ordre public is 
                                                   
41 LEVI (fn. 39), at 56; JÜRGEN BASEDOW, Die Verselbständigung des europäischen ordre public, in: CO-
ESTER/MARTINY/GESSAPHE, Privatrecht in Europa Vielfalt, Kollision, Kooperation, München 2004, 291-319, at 
295; for the influence of the international ordre public on the ordre public in of the private international law 
system and the national ordre public see ANDREAS SPICKHOFF, Der völkerrechtsbezogene ordre public, in: 
LEIBLE/RUFFERT (eds), Völkerrecht und IPR, Jena 2006, 275-303; RALF MICHAELS, Public and Private Interna-
tional Law: German Views on Global Issues, Journal of Private International Law, Vol. 4, 2008, 121-138. 
42 LEVI (fn. 39), at 59-66; JULIANE KOKOTT, Grund- und Menschenrechte als Inhalt eines internationalen ordre 
public, in COESTER-WALTJEN/KRONKE/KOKOTT (eds), Die Wirkungskraft der Grundrechte bei Fällen mit Ausland-
bezug, Berichte der deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, Heidelberg 1998, 71-114, at 77. 
43 KOKOTT (fn. 42), at 77 and 82-83. 
44 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 
1970, 3, para. 33. 
45 KOKOTT (fn. 42), at 87; however, in the East Timor judgment, the ICJ did not come to this conclusion, see 
Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), judgment of 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, 89. para. 
29. 
46 For example in a state of emergency. 
47 KOKOTT (fn. 42), at 88. 
HFR 4/2009 Rolf H. Weber/Romana Weber International ordre public 
 
Aufsatz 
 
 
HUMBOLDT FORUM RECHT – www.humboldt-forum-recht.de 
 
adapted to protect fundamental values48. 
S. 63 - HFR 4/2009 S. 12 - 
40 Human rights are the field most developed within public international law and therefore 
represent the most important foundation for the recognition of an international ordre 
public. This reasoning is based on the many existing Conventions on human rights, the 
generally recognized obligation of states to protect human rights and the third-party 
effect of these rights49.  
41 With respect to human rights, the common interests of society comprise for example 
the concern about peacekeeping, the concern to prevent situations of floods of refu-
gees or expensive humanitarian actions, the protection of human rights as factor for 
the legitimacy of the organized community of states or the recognition of the value of 
human dignity not only in the domestic sphere, but also abroad. Accordingly, human 
rights being part of the ordre public are norms, which, because of their particular im-
portance and function with relation to the peacekeeping for the sake of all, have to 
outweigh other interests50. 
42 2. Prohibition of terrorism as element of ordre public? 
The Internet as means of communication for terrorists has only recently become an 
item of discussion of global importance. Effective legal measures to encounter the 
situation do not yet exist; therefore, the concept of ordre public has so far not been 
consulted as basis for measures taken in order to prevent further terrorist acts. 
43 2.1 Balancing human rights 
Tackling terrorism is in the interest of the whole society; it promotes peace for all and 
encourages economic development. The fight against dissemination of illegal terrorist 
content on the Internet contributes significantly to the achievement of the respective 
goals51. However, security interests have to be balanced against the limitation of cer-
tain human rights. Very often, innocent people are hurt in the context of terrorist at-
tacks; these persons need to be protected, even if it means that the respective objec-
tive limits certain other rights generally recognized under international law.  
S. 64 - HFR 4/2009 S. 13 - 
44 Attacks against innocent civilians do not respect their right to life and dignity and 
should outweigh other fundamental standards such as free speech, open communica-
tion or freedom of press. If the right to life and dignity is limited, the individuals con-
cerned by this limitation of their rights will often not even be in the position to enjoy 
other human rights such as the freedom of speech. In general, three conditions have to 
be met in order to justify the limitation of the right to freedom of speech: (1) existence 
of a legal basis for the limitation, (2) the limitation aims at a legitimate goal, and (3) 
the measure is proportionate52.  
45 Whether the right to life serves as legal basis for the limitation of the right to freedom 
is controversially discussed. The German Federal Constitutional Court decided that the 
governmental forces were not allowed to fire off high-jacked airplanes53; such an ac-
                                                   
48 LEVI (fn. 39), at 70. 
49 KOKOTT (fn. 42), at 79-82; WALTER KÄLIN, Menschenrechtsverträge als Gewährleistung einer objektiven 
Ordnung, in: KÄLIN/RIEDEL/KARL/BRYDE/VON BAR/GEIMER, Aktuelle Probleme des Menschenrechtsschutzes, Hei-
delberg 1994, 9-48; see also CHRISTINE KAUFMANN, Globalisation and Labour Rights, Oxford 2007, at 230. 
50 KÄLIN (fn. 49), at 36. 
51 See also HELEN KELLER, Einschränkung der Menschenrechte zum Schutz der Menschenrechte: Folter in der 
Terrorismusbekämpfung, in KIRSCHLÄGER ET AL. (eds), Menschenrechte und Terrorismus, 1. Internationales 
Menschenrechtsforum Luzern (IHRF), Bern 2004, 175-188, at 176; KELLER (fn. 6), at 146. 
52 FRANÇOIS MOYSE, La liberté de l’expression et l’ordre public en droit européen, Annales du droit luxem-
bourgeois, 15.2005, 2006, 57-71, at, at 57-62. 
53 Deutsches Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court), 15 February 2006. 
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tion most certainly leads to the death of the passengers of the respective airplane54. 
However, human life is the vital basis of human dignity, constituting a topmost consti-
tutional principle. Every individual possesses this dignity being a person, notwithstand-
ing his/her characteristics, physical or mental condition, performance or social status. 
The state is prohibited from taking measures violating this right to human life and dig-
nity. Moreover, the state even has the obligation to protect human life from attacks by 
third parties. According to the German Federal Constitution Court, it is plainly prohib-
ited to governmental agencies to treat individuals in a way that would put their status 
as legal person in question. The fact that more lives are saved than destroyed if a 
high-jacked airplane is fired off, does not change the fact that a respective measure 
disregards the dignity of the affected persons, neither does the fact that the respective 
passengers may die anyway55. A respective measure can only be justified if simply per-
sons involved in the terrorist attack are on board of the airplane. From this judgment, 
the conclusion can be drawn that the right to life is one of the most fundamental rights 
and therefore outweighs other human rights, such as the right to freedom of speech. 
46 The goal to preserve human life and dignity is also a legitimate goal; the limitation of 
freedom of speech is reasonable and adequate to achieve this goal as the protection of 
human life is a preponderant imperative of public interest. Accordingly, the right to life 
and dignity could be considered more fundamental justifying restrictions of the free-
dom of speech, open communication or freedom of press. The protection of these fun-
damental values as part of the ordre public is a legitimate goal and allows for the limi-
tation of the mentioned freedoms56. 
47 Other ways to get attention from governments and/or society exist which do not in-
volve the destruction of lives and property, such as approaching governments, media 
etc. with ideas on the implementation of the goals of terrorists. There is no legitimate 
reason for terrorists not to use these mechanisms, and respective approaches would 
not infringe the ordre public. 
S. 65 - HFR 4/2009 S. 14 - 
48 2.2 International initiatives demonstrating the existence of a common under-
standing 
The high number of global and regional agreements57 concerning terrorism shows the 
existence of an international consensus that terrorism as phenomenon needs to be ad-
dressed. While these agreements address terrorism itself, they include (even if only 
implicitly) the use of the Internet by terrorists as part of the whole movement. Evalu-
ated from another perspective, agreements on illegal use of the Internet have also 
been concluded; in particular the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe58 
springs to mind. Combining the efforts of these two kinds of agreements would lead to 
the establishment of an international agreements of illegal use of the Internet by ter-
rorist, demonstrating the international belief that terrorism and all activities related to 
the phenomenon need to be abolished.  
49 The existence of a common understanding and the need for international co-operation 
was also laid out in “A Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and 
Terrorism” proposed by the Hoover Institution, the Consortium for Research on Infor-
mation Security and Policy (CRISP), the Center for International Security and Coopera-
tion (CISAC), and Stanford University. Considering the potentially grave consequences 
of cyber attacks, and “convinced that there is an emerging consensus regarding certain 
conduct that should be prosecuted as criminal, as well as regarding the need for 
                                                   
54 Deutsches Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court), 15 February 2006, para. 87. 
55 Deutsches Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court), 15 February 2006, paras. 
118-154. 
56 MOYSE (fn. 52), at 60. 
57 See above II. 2.2. fn. 16. 
58 See above fn. 19. 
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agreed standards and practices to enhance security”59, the proposal aims at laying out 
measures for effective international co-operation in dealing with cybercrime and terror-
ism. Illegal conduct includes the use of a cyber system as a material factor in commit-
ting a terrorist act60. Accordingly, an international consensus on the prohibition of any 
activity contributing to carrying out of terrorist acts is mirrored in the proposal61.  
50 2.3 Control measures as information channeling mechanisms 
Technical barriers to the dissemination of content in the Internet must keep in mind 
that certain institutions may disseminate the same information as terrorists, but in a 
legal way. An example thereof is information about how to build a bomb, which is con-
sidered illegal if used for terrorist purposes, but would be legal if disseminated by a 
chemistry physics online textbook62. A similar example from the past is the prohibition 
of the term “breast” in the Internet. While this prohibition was intended to serve for 
the protection of children from sex issues, all information related to breast cancer was 
also affected, even though this information is valuable to the public. 
S. 66 - HFR 4/2009 S. 15 - 
51 As experience has shown, technological experts are capable to develop methods allow-
ing to encounter such kind of situations. Possible approaches would be to install pass-
words, allowing only persons legally involved in the distribution of such information to 
have access.  
52 Another approach would be to link searched keywords with other terms that are used 
only in the dissemination of information within the legal frame (e.g. link the word 
“breast” with the word “cancer”). If terms appear in this combination, the respective 
information does not have to be removed from the Internet. Respective technologies 
would observe the fact that only the use of the Internet for terrorist means violates the 
ordre public, not, however, the information itself. 
53 2.4 Avoidance of terrorism as part of the ordre public 
Fighting terrorism as part of the ordre public is subject to change over time and meas-
ures to confront the problem have to be adapted correspondingly. While, for example, 
terrorism was understood rather in a national than in an international context a few 
decades ago, today, terrorism is understood primarily as an international phenomenon.  
54 As ordre public represents fundamental values shared globally, an international court 
composed of members from all regions of the world is in the best position to assess 
whether a particular information has to be considered illegal, and determine what con-
sequences this fact would have over time. The interests of all people have to be repre-
sented, which is unlikely to be realized in a national court. In particular, recent experi-
ences after 9/11 show that the handling of terrorist acts as well as all acts related 
thereto, including the question of liability, should be considered by an international 
court. Unlike national courts, which may be inclined to seek revenge (communications 
according to which President Bush allegedly told to CIA to kill Osama Bin Laden point in 
that direction), international tribunals are composed of independent emotionally unat-
tached judges63. A further possibility could consist in an extension of the catalogue of 
crimes conferring jurisdiction to the ICC64.  
55 In general, obligations under international law only bind the subjects of international 
                                                   
59 Preamble of the Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism. 
60 Art. 3 of the Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism. 
61 See also ABRAHAM D. SOFAER/SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN/MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR/EKATERINA A. DROZ-
DOVA/DAVID D. ELLIOT/GREGORY D. GROVE/STEPHEN J. LUKASIK/TONYA L. PUTNAM/GEORGE D. WILSON, A Proposal for 
an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism, available at 
<http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/cybercrime/stanford/cisac-draft.htm>. 
62 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (fn. 4), at 64. 
63 HEINTZE (fn. 10), at 47; see also MARTIN (fn. 9), at 226-260. 
64 HELEN KELLER/DANIELA THURNHERR, Taking International Law Seriously, Berne 2005. 
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law. Accordingly, ordre public as a source of international law binds states in particular. 
However, already five decades ago, the perception that fundamental rights can also 
bind private parties evolved in Germany. According to this theory, developed in the 
context of the application of fundamental rights values in cases in which two private 
parties were involved, the rights of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law) are not only 
defensive rights directed against the state, but they constitute an objective order of 
values (“eine objektive Werteordnung”) which permeates the whole German legal sys-
tem. The Lüth-Decision65 of the Federal Constitutional Court led to a consistent ju-
risprudence in support of this theory on the so-called “mittelbare Drittwirkung”, pursu-
ant to which the values and principles surrounding constitutional fundamental rights 
are to be considered by the courts when deciding private law cases. The German ap-
proach on “Drittwirkung” has influenced legal orders outside Germany, especially the 
member states of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)66 and Japan. This 
perception of basic rights makes rights and freedoms become basic standards of social 
life, comprising a major part of the relationships between private individuals. However, 
the actual extent of this conception remains controversial67.  
S. 67 - HFR 4/2009 S. 16 - 
56 Most human rights, including the right to life, take effect on the horizontal level and 
require states to take measures to prevent violations of these rights by private per-
sons, in particular by adopting laws and establishing effective implementation and en-
forcement procedures, i.e. they produce effect on the horizontal level between private 
parties68. Other than the concept of “Drittwirkung”, the horizontal effect is not limited 
to the repercussions that basic human rights have on relationships under private law, 
but also include states’ obligations to take further measures in order to protect human 
rights against interference by private parties69. 
57 However, the respective concept does not allow the imposition of direct obligations on 
private parties, rather it opts for an obligation of states through their public authorities 
in order to protect human rights from violations committed by non-state actors70. The 
introduction of specific regulation at the national level is necessary in order to directly 
oblige non-state actors to adhere to fundamental human rights; respective provisions 
can be found in several national orders71. Considering the importance of the prohibition 
of terrorism, a generally applicable, mandatory obligation of private parties to refrain 
from contributions to terrorist acts, and the possibility to hold these actors liable if they 
do not comply with this obligation appears to be worth to be established. 
58 IV. Implementation 
1. Technological measures 
While the concept of ordre public is theoretical, measures have to be found to translate 
this concept into the practical world. Concerning the Internet framework, in particular 
technical measures may be adequate to decrease terrorist activities, thereby contribut-
ing to the implementation of the ordre public. Such technical measures are to be im-
plemented by the Internet providers based on the concept of horizontal effects of hu-
man rights. 
59 1.1 Content monitoring 
                                                   
65 Deutsches Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court), 15 January 1958. 
66 Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, done at Rome on 4 November 1950. 
67 See ANNE CHEUNG/ROLF H. WEBER, Internet Governance and the Responsibility of Internet Service Provid-
ers, Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 26, 2008, at 438-441, with further references. 
68 MANFRED NOWAK, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd ed. Kehl am Rhein 
2005, at Introduction, para. 4; KAUFMANN (fn. 49), at 42-43. 
69 NOWAK (fn. 68), at § 2, para. 20; for the obligation of states to protect the security and physical integrity 
of their citizens in particular see NOWAK (fn. 68), at § 9, para. 7. 
70 CHEUNG/WEBER (fn. 67), at 439. 
71 For examples see CHEUNG/WEBER (fn. 67), at 437-449. 
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Different kinds of software-based architectural solutions could contribute to the elimi-
nation of illegal content on the Internet. In particular the use of filtering machines72 
being able to block certain sites that should not be accessible by the public can be very 
effective. However, experience has shown that this approach has not been widely used, 
and that technological solutions are at best a narrow and short-term remedy. 
S. 68 - HFR 4/2009 S. 17 - 
60 (1) The mixture of languages makes it difficult to determine the content of each mes-
sage. Furthermore, the use of passwords also complicates the job of monitors of Inter-
net content. Nevertheless, using modern technology, inspectors should be able to ac-
cess all information displayed online73. In order to pay respect to individuals’ privacy, 
examining the content of private messages should only be admissible if a court allows 
it. Known terrorists are the prime candidates for a respective measure. Identifying 
messages between them is indispensable to protect human rights and thereby realizing 
the obligations under the prohibition of terrorism as part of the ordre public, obliging 
all members of society to contribute to that goal.  
61 (2) Another measure would be to install rating systems built into the Internet browser 
software as a “content advisor”, which can contain options for restricting access to ille-
gal sites. Furthermore, it is possible to link the software to a rating platform, such as 
the Platform for Internet Content Selection Rules (PICS). PICS was developed in 1995 
by the World Wide Web Consortium and enabled Web publishers to mark their websites 
with computer-readable metatags rating the content of the respective website. The 
idea of this program was to restrict access to certain Internet content, without having 
to censor the respective information altogether74. However, critics argued that this 
program could also be used by, in particular, repressive, governments to filter content 
automatically without input from the end user75. Nevertheless, the program is still in 
use, although it has been replaced to a large degree by the Resource Description 
Framework (RDF), which also rates Internet content76. If recruitment of terrorists, fi-
nancing of terrorist actions, search of information on how to build bombing devices etc. 
are no longer possible in the online world, the address range of terrorists and their 
possibilities concerning terrorist activities will be highly delimited. As the carrying-out 
of terrorist acts becomes difficult, their number will decrease. This fact reflects the ef-
fectiveness of Internet content monitoring technologies, contributing to the respect of 
the ordre public77. 
62 Experience has shown that systems of Internet blocks and filters are difficult to handle. 
Technological innovation usually allows existing hurdles to be overcome in a relatively 
short time. Computer hackers around the world use their knowledge to find alternative 
technical solutions to get results that should not be achieved by individuals. A conse-
                                                   
72 For the filtering of data carried on the Internet see LESSIG (fn. 29), at 157. 
73 An example for an according mechanism able to decrypt passwords is the code-named “Magic Lantern” 
used by the FBI. Magic Lantern is a program which is sent to the suspect’s computer, installs itself and then 
records every keystroke typed; these are analyzed by the FBI to find passwords enabling the FBI to access 
the suspect’s e-mail, documents and computers contacted by the suspect; WEIMANN (fn. 1), at 188; FLORIAN 
RÖTZER, FBI bestätigt Entwicklung des Schnüffelprogramms Magic Lantern, available at < 
http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/11/11333/1.html>. 
74 WEBER (fn. 1), at 202; BIEGEL (fn. 27), at 201-202; LESSIG (fn. 30); see also <http://www.w3.org/PICS/>. 
75 JEREMY MALCOLM, Multi-Stakeholder Governance, Perth 2008, at 68. 
76 MALCOLM (fn. 75), at 81; for RDF in general see <http://www.w3.org/RDF/ >. 
77 The use of Carnivore, officially named DCS 1000, is another mechanism to monitor Internet content used 
by the FBI. Carnivore is comparable to a telephone wiretap, but applied to the Internet. It examines packets 
of information exchanged and records those that relate to suspicious issues. It is in particular used to inter-
cept online communication (such as e-mail) passing through the Internet. Carnivore itself remains passive 
and does not change contents or messages. However, it scans millions of e-mails per seconds. The main 
concern of Carnivore is that it gives the FBI access to the traffic of all users of a given Internet service pro-
vider, not only those identified by a court, which infringes the right to privacy of many users; WEIMANN (fn. 
1), at 184-187; see also <http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa080601a.htm>; 
<http://www.cotse.net/privacy/carnivore.htm; <http://epic.org/privacy/carnivore/>. 
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quence of this situation is the need to quickly change software filter programs78. The 
fact that systems have to be adapted continuously in order to pay respect to technolo-
gical progress is also advantageous with view to the ordre public, as the ordre public 
can be subject of change according to the world’s population’s perception, too. By con-
stant work on technological measures, the existence and definition of the prohibition of 
terrorism has to be kept in mind and eventual changes will most probably be recog-
nized within a short period of time. 
S. 69 - HFR 4/2009 S. 18 - 
63 (3) In 2000, the United States proposed the establishment of an international cyber-
police to fight cybercrime. This cyberpolice would be worldwide in coverage and par-
ticipation and allow for rapid investigations over global communication networks. How-
ever, the project was not realized because the European Union opposed to the estab-
lishment of such a body arguing that there were privacy implications and differences 
among states in the definition of cybercrime79.  
64 (4) Capturing traffic over the Internet is called “sniffing”; the software searching the 
traffic and grabbing the searched information being the “sniffer”. Technologically, snif-
fers use computers which are constantly communicating with other computers, most 
often using a local area network. This network uses filters to block or not to block users 
from getting the respective information. If the network is not “switched”, the informa-
tion is broadcast to every computer. The sniffer program tells a computer to monitor 
the traffic of information between all computers, peels away the layers of encapsulation 
and decodes the relevant information, including the identities of the source and of the 
target computer, and every piece of information exchanged between these two com-
puters80.  
65 (5) In addition to the elimination of illegal content, ongoing monitoring of Internet con-
tent is also necessary to effectively fight against cyberterrorism. Possible approaches 
are to monitor the Internet by eavesdropping on e-mail and phone calls. These meas-
ures allow to track terrorists and criminals based on their online moves, such as using 
a credit card, sending an e-mail message, booking a flight, or paying a toll as respec-
tive activities leave an electronic trail81. Suspicious messages of potential terrorists 
have to be searched and identified, as well as distinguished from the everyday elec-
tronic traffic of millions of Internet users82. Messages exchanged between these per-
sons are of high value to bodies fighting terrorism, as they give information about the 
terrorists’ locations, planned attacks, etc. Only with this information available, the re-
sponsible bodies will be able to prevent violations of human rights and thereby contrib-
ute to compliance with the ordre public. 
66 1.2 Storing of Internet content 
In March 2006, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union en-
acted the Data Retention Directive83, requiring all providers of electronic communica-
tions services and networks to keep traffic data related to phone calls and e-mails for a 
period of six months to two years84. Traffic data is defined to include the information 
necessary to identify the originator and the recipient of phone calls and e-mails, to-
gether with information on the time, date, and duration of these phone calls and 
emails85. Such data must be made available to the law enforcers at the national level, 
as well as to law enforcers in other member states86. In turn, state authorities are re-
                                                   
78 WEBER (fn. 1), at 194. 
79 WEIMANN (fn. 1), at 238. 
80 WEIMANN (fn. 1), at 183-184. 
81 WEIMANN (fn. 1), at 182. 
82 WEIMANN (fn. 1), at 183. 
83 Council Directive 2006/24/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54-58. 
84 Art. 6 Data Retention Directive. 
85 Art. 5 Data Retention Directive. 
86 Art. 4 Data Retention Directive. 
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quired to comply with the procedural standard of necessity and proportionality in their 
legal implementation, set out by Article 887. Member states are expected to transpose 
the requirements of the Directive into national laws until March 200988. The 2006 en-
actment can be seen as an attempt to strike a reasonable balance between law en-
forcement, combating of terrorist activities, and crime investigation on the one hand, 
and the protection of privacy on the other89. 
S. 70 - HFR 4/2009 S. 19 - 
67 Despite the advantages of modern technological measures to fight against illegal con-
tent on the Internet, the use of advanced techniques to monitor, search, track, and 
analyze Internet content, these techniques also hand participating governments, espe-
cially authoritarian governments and agencies with little public accountability, tools 
with which to violate civil liberties domestically and abroad90.  
68 For similar reasons, ZITTRAIN also considers the storing of Internet traffic an “awful 
idea”: If the examination of Internet communications becomes routine rather than a 
reaction to a specific suspicion, the right to privacy of individual persons is violated. As 
according monitoring is unnoticeable to Internet users, data collected would remain in 
the hands of the collecting body, without users ever knowing it91. Different interests 
have to be balanced in every case of taking a specific measure to delimit Internet con-
tent; information put online must not be censored on a general basis. Furthermore, if 
information is denied access or removed, this measure must be declared to the user 
wanting to put the respective content on the Internet.  
69 The prohibition of terrorism being part of the ordre public requires the responsible au-
thorities to take all measures necessary for the attainment of this goal. This may in-
clude the storing of Internet traffic. However, with view to the speed of exchange of 
information and the mobility of terrorists, it is debatable whether the storing of data is 
absolutely necessary to eliminate terrorism as a phenomenon. Flows of information 
have to be detected and eliminated promptly in order to prevent terrorist attacks; the 
storing of data by itself does not contribute to the elimination of terrorism. 
70 In order to address this problem of potential abuse, a body responsible for monitoring 
the activities of individual governments needs to be established, preferably at the in-
ternational level. A possible approach to ensure that the fight against illegal content on 
the Internet is not misused would be to oblige governments to inform the respective 
body of the action they intend to take concerning this issue. The body then has to as-
sess the admissibility of the respective measure and give its approval to the concerned 
government.  
71 In general, better information about terrorists’ uses of the Internet in order to monitor 
their activities is necessary to develop the technical infrastructure to prevent the dis-
semination of illegal content on the Internet. 
72 2. Liability of Internet providers 
Internet providers have a controlling position in respect of Internet content and should 
therefore carry a corresponding responsibility; controlling Internet content is not only a 
power, but also an obligation. However, most general criminal law rules of participation 
are insufficient to address the problem of dissemination of illegal terrorist content on 
the Internet. Special legislation is required to prevent the respective information and to 
                                                   
87 Art. 8 Data Retention Directive. 
88 Art. 15 Data Retention Directive. 
89 CHEUNG/WEBER (fn. 67), at 473; see generally FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, Privacy and Law Enforcement in the 
European Union: The Data Retention Directive, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, 2007, 233-255. 
90 WEIMANN (fn. 1), at 58. 
91 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, Beware the Cyber Cops, Forbes, Vol. 170 (8 July 2002), at 62. 
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enforce provisions by defining responsibility92. 
S. 71 - HFR 4/2009 S. 20 - 
73 Internet providers are not directly bound by human rights. However, horizontal effects 
and the theory of “Drittwirkung” of the right to life in terms of a state obligation are 
generally acknowledged. Horizontal effects of human rights do not impose direct obli-
gations on Internet providers93. Nevertheless, the question of liability of Internet pro-
viders if illegal, terrorism-related content is disseminated is addressed in the following.  
74 Internet providers can filter or censor information94. This ability should not only be a 
power of Internet providers, but also an obligation to prevent the dissemination of ille-
gal content. In Europe, a consensus is emerging that Internet providers should be held 
responsible for controlling content disseminated on the Internet. The E-Commerce-
Directive of June 200095 distinguishes between providers “providing access to the 
Internet” and providers offering other services, in particular “providing hosting con-
tent”, produced by themselves or by other users.  
75 On the basis of this distinction, different degrees of liability can be established, accord-
ing to the function of the provider and its direct contact to the content. The E-
Commerce-Directive addresses the problem of holding providers liable for the dissemi-
nation of illegal information. In cases of involving the “mere conduit” of data, access 
providers are exempted from liability; providers are not obliged to monitor the dis-
semination of information (Art. 15). Providers of hosting content are only liable in 
cases involving the storing of data if they have actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
information (Art. 14). Meanwhile, it is generally acknowledged that providers putting a 
special emphasis on their editorial role should be fully liable if illegal content is dis-
seminated; if the content originates from elsewhere, providers should be liable to the 
extent the are informed of the illegality of the content and it was feasible for the to 
identify and technically control the material in order to remove it from online circula-
tion96. However, if operators only provide access to the Internet, without having any 
influence on its content, liability should only be established if they are themselves the 
content-providers or if they had been informed of the illegal content and did not take 
the steps necessary to remove it from a service offered.  
76 Thus, as a rule, Internet providers should be held liable if they themselves contributed 
to the dissemination of illegal content or were informed and failed to take the neces-
sary steps to prevent it97. A broad responsibility of Internet providers is justifiable con-
sidering the enormous negative effect the dissemination of illegal content may have. 
This approach does not burden Internet providers with insurmountable difficulties in 
complying with the respective provisions, either. Appropriate law-enforcement or self-
regulatory bodies or will have to be appointed to enforce liability regulations98. 
77 Establishing liability for Internet providers is not only ensuring a free exchange of in-
formation and legal certainty for Internet providers, but also ensures prosecution of 
past crimes and prevents the dissemination of illegal content in the future. It further-
more provides the basis for “notice and takedown procedures”99, contributing to the 
elimination of illegal content on the Internet. Hotlines collecting tips from users con-
cerning illegal information can induce Internet providers to take down illegal content so 
that the respective information is no longer accessible to the public; the police can 
                                                   
92 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (fn. 4), at 72. 
93 See above III. 2.4, fn. 65-70. 
94 CHEUNG/WEBER (fn. 67), at 408-411. 
95 Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178), 1-16. 
96 See also COUNCIL OF EUROPE (fn. 4), at 72-73; SIEBER (fn. 36), at 370-374. 
97 GREWLICH (fn. 14), at 275-276. 
98 GREWLICH (fn. 14), at 276. 
99 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (fn. 4), at 73. 
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even force them to do so100.  
S. 72 - HFR 4/2009 S. 21 - 
78 However, the identification of providers can be difficult. Therefore, rules have to be es-
tablished obliging providers to keep a log of usages for a certain period. This obliga-
tion, though, asks for another balancing of interests between the will to prevent the 
dissemination of illegal terrorist information on the Internet and the privacy of Internet 
users wanting to disseminate content through providers101.  
79 Tendencies to hold non-state actors liable under international law can be discerned. 
Obligations concerning the conduct of private actors are displayed in many (non-
binding) international codes. These codes may influence the field of activity of Internet 
providers. Furthermore, Internet providers should become active themselves by apply-
ing self-regulative codes of conduct102. 
80 3. Soft sanctions for countries not co-operating 
Terrorism in general is prohibited by the international ordre public. The obligation to 
ensure that the prohibition of terrorism is realized addresses all states; governments 
have to guarantee that the respective prohibition is effectively implemented within 
their territories. This fact requires states to co-operate because most terrorists nowa-
days act internationally and the Internet has a global dimension. Disseminating illegal 
terrorist content contributes to terrorist acts, which are a threat to peace and justify 
sanctions for countries which do not co-operate in the effort to eliminate such contribu-
tions. Soft law, and in particular soft sanctions, is not a poor relation to hard law and 
may be the best form of governance for international co-operation. However, before 
any sanctions are taken against a state not complying with its obligations, the respec-
tive state should be formally warned.  
81 Sanctions are considered “soft” if they do not use force. However, they can consist in 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, tele-
graphic, radio, or other means of communication as well as in the severance of diplo-
matic relations. Such sanctions are contained in Art. 41 of the Charter of the UN103. 
Further soft sanctions would be to impose a fine on the state not complying with its 
obligation to co-operate or the termination of humanitarian assistance. States are free 
in their choice of soft sanctions, which do not have to be proportionate or previously 
announced to the concerned state104. Sanctions must be supervised during their being 
in force. If the state complies with its obligation to ensure that human rights are not 
violated and takes respective measures, the sanctions have to be suspended.  
82 The issue of the efficacy of sanctions is still controversially discussed. However, the 
damage that, in particular economic, sanctions may do to the civil society of a state, 
especially if the state does not operate in good faith, may be devastating. Therefore, 
sanctions should only be taken as an ultima ratio, and it should be made sure they do 
not affect the population, but rather the decision-making authorities105.  
S. 73 - HFR 4/2009 S. 22 - 
83 V. Conclusions 
The abuse of the Internet is a global threat. Therefore, the dissemination of illegal con-
tent on the Internet, including terrorist information, has to be tackled. Existing meas-
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ures are not sufficient to satisfactorily solve this problem. New mechanisms need to be 
established, preferably at the international level; the Internet as a global framework 
and the worldwide movement of terrorists ask for an international regulation. States 
can either co-operate directly, or co-operation can be institutionalized and take the 
form of an international body which represents a common understanding of all states.  
84 Many international Conventions on terrorism in general are already in existence. How-
ever, provisions concerning international co-operation need to be concretized and 
measures have to be found to effectively implement and enforce them. Furthermore, 
the problem of terrorist use of the Internet needs to be more specifically addressed in 
international agreements. 
85 The fact that terrorism merits to be prohibited is commonly acknowledged and consti-
tutes part of the international ordre public. Terrorist acts violate human rights, in par-
ticular the right to life as one of the most fundamental human rights. The goals of ter-
rorists do not justify violations of these rights. However, the outcome of the balancing 
between security interests and, in particular, freedom of speech, is controversially dis-
cussed.  
86 If the security interests outweigh the individual’s rights to freedom of speech or open 
communication in a particular case, the illegal information has to be removed from the 
Internet. However, not only repressive, but also preventive actions need to be taken. 
Preventive efforts can consist in the introduction of technological barriers, the threat 
for Internet providers of being held liable or the threat for nation states of being sanc-
tioned for not complying with their obligations.  
 
 
Zitierempfehlung: Rolf H. Weber/Romana Weber, HFR 2009, S. 52 ff. 
